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Introduction and Summary
We appreciate the opportunity to comment on the state of antitrust law and commend the
Committee for its bipartisan investigation into digital markets. This important investigation
promises to help us better understand, protect, and promote competition in digital markets.
We are concerned that market power is on the rise in the U.S. economy generally, including in
the digital markets that are the Committee’s focus. Growing market power harms consumers and
workers, slows innovation, and limits productivity growth. Courts have contributed to increased
monopoly power through decisions that have weakened the prohibitions against anticompetitive
exclusionary conduct and anticompetitive mergers. The circumscribed state of the law and
insufficient resources have resulted in insufficiently aggressive government enforcement. And
when enforcers do bring meritorious cases, their success has been hampered by serious
deficiencies in the contemporary judicial interpretation of the antitrust statutes.
In short, economic research establishes that market power is now a serious problem, and that
current antitrust doctrines are too limited to protect competition adequately, making it needlessly
difficult to stop anticompetitive conduct in digital markets.
The antitrust laws, as interpreted and enforced today, are inadequate to confront and deter
growing market power in the U.S. economy and unnecessarily limit the ability of antitrust
enforcers to address anticompetitive conduct in the digital markets that the Committee is
investigating. For the reasons set forth below, we believe than any conclusion to the contrary
reflects either an incomplete or incorrect understanding of economics and the economic literature
from the last several decades.
On similar occasions in the past, most notably in 1914 and 1950, Congress acted to correct the
direction that the courts had taken by strengthening the antitrust laws. It is once again time for
Congress to step in. In broad overview, Congress should update the antitrust laws to:
•
•
•
•
•

Correct flawed judicial rules that reflect unsound economic theories or
unsupported empirical claims
Clarify that the antitrust laws protect against competitive harms from the loss of
potential and nascent competition, especially harms to innovation
Incorporate presumptions that better reflect the likelihood that certain practices
harm competition
Recognize that under some circumstances conduct that creates a risk of
substantial harm should be unlawful even if the harm cannot be shown to be more
likely than not
Alter substantive legal standards and the allocation of pleading, production, and
proof burdens to reduce barriers to demonstrating meritorious cases
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Congress also should improve the effectiveness of antitrust enforcement by increasing the
resources available to the federal antitrust enforcement agencies and increasing penalties.
Our discussion below identifies the problems and proposals for correcting them. The signatories
to this letter strongly believe that antitrust enforcement has become too lax, in large part because
of the courts, and that Congress must act to correct this problem. Specific variations on this
theme are described below, although not all of the signatories agree on all the variations. 1 We
hope the Committee will respond to these concerns with appropriate legislation, and we would
be happy to work with the Committee to help develop legislative language.
Background on Growing Market Power
Effective antitrust enforcement helps protect and foster competitive markets, and thus helps
ensure competitive prices for products and services, spurs innovation, and provides a business
environment conducive to entrepreneurial activity. Notwithstanding our well-developed antitrust
laws and extensive enforcement institutions, today’s U.S. economy suffers from growing market
power, in both product markets and labor markets. 2 The direct victims include consumers and
other exploited buyers, and workers, farmers and other exploited suppliers. In addition, growing
market power slows the rate of innovation and productivity growth in the economy as a whole. 3
Overly lenient antitrust rules in the areas of primary concern to the Committee—mergers and
monopolization (which usually involves exclusionary conduct)—have likely contributed
substantially to our market power problem. 4 Market power is on the rise in a number of major

By signing this statement, a signatory does not necessarily endorse every specific conclusion reached in the
statement or stated in a document referenced in the statement.

1

See generally JONATHAN B. BAKER, THE ANTITRUST PARADIGM (2019); Fiona Scott Morton, Reforming U.S.
antitrust enforcement and competition policy, in VISION 2020: EVIDENCE FOR A STRONGER ECONOMY (Washington
Center for Equitable Growth, 2020); Carl Shapiro, Protecting Competition in the American Economy: Merger
Control, Tech Titans, Labor Markets, 33 J. ECON. PERSP. 69 (2019). These sources also explain why benign
explanations for the economic evidence of growing market power are insufficient. On labor market power, see
Suresh Naidu, Eric Posner & E. Glen Weyl, Antitrust Remedies for Labor Market Power, 132 HARV. L. REV. 537
(2018).
2

See generally, Carl Shapiro, Competition and Innovation: Did Arrow Hit the Bull’s Eye?, in THE RATE AND
DIRECTION OF INVENTIVE ACTIVITY REVISITED (Josh Lerner & Scott Stern, eds. 2012); Nicholas Bloom & John Van
Reenen, Why Do Management Practices Differ Across Firms and Countries? 24 J. ECON. PERSP. 203 (2010);
Thomas J. Holmes & James A. Schmitz Jr., Competition and Productivity: A Review of Evidence, 2 ANN’L REV.
ECON. 619 (2010); Jonathan B. Baker, Beyond Schumpeter vs. Arrow: How Antitrust Fosters Innovation, 74
ANTITRUST L. J. 575 (2007).
3

Because the Committee’s request focused on exclusionary conducts and mergers, we do not discuss problems with
antitrust enforcement involving collusive conduct, such as horizontal agreements, other than as facilitated by
merger.

4

2
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industries, including, for example, airlines, 5 brewing, 6 and hospitals, 7 where multiple horizontal
mergers that were allowed to proceed without antitrust challenge have markedly increased
concentration in important markets and facilitated the exercise of market power. 8 Exclusionary
conduct by dominant companies that stifles competition from actual and potential rivals—
including nascent rivals with capabilities for challenging a dominant firm’s market power and
firms with competing R&D efforts—impairs what is often the most important economic force
creating competitive pressure for dominant firms. 9 Although government monopolization cases
have never been common in the modern era, 10 they have become even less common in recent
years, even though market power has been on the rise. 11 According to its workload reports, the
E.g., Federico Ciliberto & Jonathan W. Williams, Does Multimarket Contact Facilitate Tacit Collusion? Inference
on Conduct Parameters in the Airline Industry, 45 RAND J. Econ. 764 (2014); Gaurab Aryal, Federico Ciliberto &
Benjamin T. Leyden, Public Communication and Collusion in the Airline Industry (Becker Friedman Inst., Working
Paper No. 2018-11, 2018); Severin Borenstein & Nancy L. Rose, How Airline Markets Work . . . Or Do They?
Regulatory Reform in the Airline Industry, in ECONOMIC REGULATION AND ITS REFORM: WHAT HAVE WE
LEARNED? 63 (Nancy L. Rose, ed. 2014).
5

E.g., Nathan H. Miller & Matthew C. Weinberg, Understanding the Price Effects of the MillerCoors Joint Venture,
85 ECONOMETRICA 1763 (2017); Nathan H. Miller, Gloria Sheu & Matthew C. Weinberg, Oligopolistic Price
Leadership and Mergers: The United States Beer Industry (Working Paper 2019), available at
https://ssrn.com/abstract=3239248. Although a large number of craft brewers have entered in recent years, they
cannot easily and inexpensively expand output, so the craft brewing sector remains too small to undermine the
market power of the large brewers that account for most of the beer sold.
6

7

E.g., Martin Gaynor, Diagnosing the Problem: Exploring the Effects of Consolidation and Anticompetitive

Conduct in Health Care Markets (Testimony before the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, March 7, 2019); Zack Cooper,
Stuart Craig, Martin Gaynor & John Van Reenen, The Price Ain’t Right? Hospital Prices and Health Spending on
the Privately Insured, 134 Q. J. ECON. 51 (2019); Matt Schmitt, Multimarket Contact in the Hospital Industry, 10
AM. ECON. J. ECON. POL’Y 361 (2018); David M. Cutler & Fiona Scott Morton. Hospitals, Market Share, and
Consolidation, 310 J. AM. MED. ASS’N. 1964 (2013); Leemore Dafny, Kate Ho & Robin S. Lee, The Price Effects of
Cross-Market Hospital Mergers (NBER Working Paper No. 22106 2016).
The economic literature, including the studies referenced supra notes 5-7 establishes that firms are exercising
market power in these and other industries through evidence independent of concentration trends in those industries.
Put differently, the evidence that market power is on the rise is neither based exclusively nor primarily on evidence
about trends in market concentration. We do not rely on evidence about concentration trends in the economy as a
whole, which is less reliable than evidence about trends in concentration in particular markets.

8

On the feasibility and profitability of exclusionary conduct generally see Fiona Scott Morton, Modern U.S.
antitrust theory and evidence amid rising concerns of market power and its effects 19-24 (Washington Center for
Equitable Growth, 2019), https://equitablegrowth.org/research-paper/modern-u-s-antitrust-theory-and-evidenceamid-rising-concerns-of-market-power-and-its-effects/; Jonathan B. Baker, Exclusion as a Core Competition
Concern, 78 ANTITRUST L.J. 527 (2013).
9

By one count, the two federal enforcement agencies collectively brought 20 monopolization or attempt to
monopolize cases between 1977 and 2000, or less than one per year. By contrast, between 1961 and 1976 the
agencies brought 48 cases, or 3 per year. William E. Kovacic, The Modern Evolution of U.S. Competition Policy
Enforcement Norms, 71 ANTITRUST L.J. 377, 449 tbl. 4 (2003).
10

The number of civil non-merger cases brought by the federal enforcement agencies has been declining. One study
finds that the annual average fell from 10.8 cases between 1999 and 2008 to 7.5 cases between 2009 and 2018 —
and that most of these cases challenge collusive agreements, not exclusionary conduct. Michael Kades, State of
Federal Antitrust Enforcement Fig. 10 (Washington Center for Equitable Growth 2019),
https://equitablegrowth.org/research-paper/the-state-of-u-s-federal-antitrust-enforcement/?longform=true. Although
trends in the number of cases may have multiple interpretations in the abstract, declining case counts in an
11

3
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Antitrust Division of the U.S. Department of Justice has brought just a single case under Section
2 of the Sherman Act during this century. 12
Growing market power is a concern in the digital marketplaces that are the focus of the
Committee’s investigation. 13 Platforms are often insulated from platform competition to a
substantial extent by substantial scale economies in supply and demand (network effects)
combined with customer switching costs. 14 The financial markets appear to value many large
platforms at levels reflecting an expectation that they will earn substantial rents from the exercise
of market power for an extended period of time. Moreover, the economic studies indicating that
market power has grown over time suggest that it has increased particularly among firms that
extensively employ information technology, both in information technology industries
themselves and elsewhere in the economy. 15
Large online platforms often exist in winner-take-all and winner-take-most markets. In those
markets, there are likely to be long periods where a firm has a monopoly or dominant position,
which makes anticompetitive conduct more dangerous. 16 Exclusionary conduct and mergers
involving online platforms, particularly dominant ones, can harm competition among platforms
and harm competition among users on platforms. Large online platforms are often prolific
acquirers of other firms, including firms that might otherwise have become platform rivals or
could facilitate the entry of such rivals. 17
Antitrust law and enforcement have failed to respond to growing market power in substantial
part because many key antitrust precedents—particularly those precedents governing
exclusionary conduct—rely on unsound economic theories or unsupported empirical claims
about the competitive effects of certain practices. In part for this reason, the antitrust rules
constructed by the courts reflect a systematically skewed error cost balance: they are too
environment of rising market power indicate that enforcement has not stepped up to address the market power
problem.
Scott Morton, supra note 9 at Fig. 1. Although some exclusionary conduct cases may be brought under Section 1
of the Sherman Act, which bars unreasonable restraints of trade, the vast majority involve agreements between
competitors and not exclusionary conduct. Moreover, the number of Justice Department civil Section 1 cases has
been falling as well. See Kades, supra note 11.
12

Our reasons for concern about the conduct of digital platforms and their exercise of market power, set forth in
this paragraph and the next, do not include their mere size.
13

See Report of the Digital Competition Expert Panel, Unlocking digital competition 35 ¶¶ 1.81-1.88 (2019),
https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/unlocking-digital-competition-report-of-the-digital-competitionexpert-panel; Jacques Crémer, Yves-Alexandre de Montjoye & Heike Schwitzer, Competition Policy for the digital
era, 21-22, 36, 90 (European Union 2019), https://ec.europa.eu/competition/publications/reports/kd0419345enn.pdf;
Stigler Center for the study of the Economy and the State, Committee for the Study of Digital Platforms, Market
Structure and Antitrust Subcommittee, 4, 6, 13-17, 40, 66 (Stigler Center July 2019),
https://research.chicagobooth.edu/-/media/research/stigler/pdfs/market-structurereport.pdf?la=en&hash=E08C7C9AA7367F2D612DE24F814074BA43CAED8C.
14

15

Baker, supra note 2 at 18-20.

16

See generally Stigler Center, supra note 14.

17

See Stigler Center, supra note 14 at 53 n.110, 66-67.

4
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concerned to avoid both chilling procompetitive conduct and the high costs of litigation, and too
dismissive of the costs of failing to deter harmful conduct. Excessively permissive precedents
and unsound or unsupported economic claims have, in turn, encouraged overly cautious
enforcement policies and overly demanding proof requirements and have discouraged
government enforcers and private plaintiffs from bringing meritorious exclusionary conduct
cases. 18 These developments have likely contributed to an increased incidence and exercise of
market power across the U.S. economy.
Overly lenient antitrust rules have been defended with reference to mistaken and unjustified
assumptions—including erroneous claims that markets self-correct quickly, monopolies best
promote innovation, firms with monopoly power can obtain only a single monopoly profit,
vertical restraints and mergers almost invariably benefit competition even in oligopoly markets,
courts and enforcers are manipulated by complaining competitors, and courts cannot tell whether
exclusionary conduct harms competition or benefits it. Each of those mistaken assumptions leads
courts to underestimate the likelihood antitrust violations and the resulting harm. 19 The evidence
shows, in contrast to these mistaken assumptions, that: 20
•
•
•
•
•

18

Without legal intervention, markets often take a long time to correct
anticompetitive activity
Monopolies can and often do stifle innovation
A monopolist can often earn additional profits by extending its monopoly into
related markets, or by using exclusionary conduct to preserve market power in its
primary market
Vertical restraints and mergers, particularly in oligopoly markets, deserve no
presumption that they improve competition—in many cases they can harm
competition 21
Both the enforcement agencies and the courts understand that competitors may
have ulterior motives, and they can judge them; the more likely danger is that
generalist judges with limited antitrust experience or expertise are too willing to
accept the self-serving testimony of defendants over documents and economic
reasoning 22

Moreover, the adoption of more lenient antitrust rules has not simplified antitrust litigation.

For an example, see Michael Kades, Underestimating the cost of underenforcing U.S. antitrust laws (Washington
Center for Equitable Growth 2019) (discussing history of antitrust litigation challenging reverse-payments
settlements), https://equitablegrowth.org/competitive-edge-underestimating-the-cost-of-underenforcing-u-s-antitrustlaws/.
19

Jonathan B. Baker, Taking the Error Out of “Error Cost” Analysis: What’s Wrong with Antitrust’s Right, 80
ANTITRUST L.J. 1 (2015).

20

Marissa Beck & Fiona M. Scott Morton, Evaluating the Evidence on Vertical Mergers (2020),
https://ssrn.com/abstract=3554073, survey the literature on vertical mergers and explain why the older studies of the
consequences of vertical conduct surveyed in Francine Lafontaine & Margaret Slade, Vertical Integration and Firm
Boundaries: The Evidence, 45 J. ECON. LIT. 629 (2007), do not support a claim that vertical integration should be
presumed to benefit competition.

21

United States v. AT&T, Inc., 310 F. Supp. 3d 166, 204 (dismissing companies’ internal documents) (D.D.C.
2018), aff’d 916 F.3d 1029 (D.C. Cir. 2019); id. at 211 (accepting credibility of defendants’ witnesses); New York v.

22

5
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In the next two sections, we identify specific problems with antitrust statutes and precedents
involving monopolization and mergers that Congress could usefully address. We also point out
ways the institutional structure of antitrust enforcement could be improved to enhance
enforcement.
Legal Rules
The antitrust case law recognizes that anticompetitive exclusion, by a dominant firm or
otherwise, is a serious problem when demonstrated. 23 The prohibitions against anticompetitive
mergers are also well-established.
The courts nonetheless have thrown up inappropriate hurdles that limit the practical scope of the
antitrust laws’ application to anticompetitive exclusionary conduct, including monopolization,
and to anticompetitive mergers. As Howard Law Professor Andrew Gavil explains with respect
to the monopolization statute, “Section 2 [of the Sherman Act] has been largely circumscribed to
the point where major government prosecutions are rare, and few private challenges succeed.” 24
Over time, the courts have become hospitable to horizontal mergers in all but the most
concentrated oligopoly markets, leading government enforcers to do the same. 25 Over the past
two decades, the courts have generally decided litigated merger cases in favor of government
enforcers, 26 but troubling aspects of the reasoning in four very recent government merger
Deutsche Telekom AG, 2020 WL 635499 at *41-*42 (D.D.C. 2018) (rejecting documentary evidence and accepting
self-interested testimony of defendants). Other courts have questioned the credibility of defendant witnesses, e.g.,
U.S. v. Sabre Corp., 2020 WL 1855433 (D. Del. 2020), and the Supreme Court has cautioned against uncritical
judicial acceptance of defendant witness testimony in antitrust cases. United States v. Gypsum Co., 333 U.S. 364,
396 (1948) (“Where such testimony is in conflict with contemporaneous documents, we can give it little weight,
particularly when the crucial issues involve mixed questions of law and fact. Despite the opportunity of the trial
court to appraise the credibility of the witnesses, we cannot under the circumstances of this case rule otherwise than
that Finding 118 is clearly erroneous.”). We are concerned that some judges, in making credibility determinations,
may be improperly influenced by the erroneous assumption that the enforcement agencies systematically bring cases
at the instigation of rivals, which may be inefficient or unsuccessful, seeking to manipulate the judicial system for
their private advantage. Baker, supra note 20 at 25-29. More generally with respect to monopolization, excluded
fringe and potential rivals to dominant firms are systematically disadvantaged by the litigation process, biasing
judicial outcomes to favor dominant firms. Erik Hovenkamp & Steven C. Salop, Asymmetric Stakes in Antitrust
Litigation (Working Paper 2020), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3563843. In general, dominant firms have more to gain
by defending their profits from exercising market power than small rivals have to gain by protecting their ability to
earn (smaller) competitive profits.
23

Baker, supra note 9 at 535-43.

Andrew Gavil, Competitive Edge: Crafting a monopolization law for our time, (March 27, 2019),
https://equitablegrowth.org/competitive-edge-crafting-a-monopolization-law-for-our-time/.
24

See William E. Kovacic, Assessing the Quality of Competition Policy: The Case of Horizontal Merger
Enforcement, 5 COMPETITION POL’Y INT’L 129, 143-44 (2009) (describing the relaxation of the threshold number of
significant post-merger competitors prompting agency scrutiny of horizontal mergers from the 1960s through the
2000s, influenced by changing judicial standards); JOHN KWOKA, MERGERS, MERGER CONTROL, AND REMEDIES 2433 (2015) (describing changes over time in the likelihood of FTC enforcement by concentration level).
25

This success rate may reflect overly cautious case selection by enforcers too concerned with litigation risk and is
unlikely to reflect a change in the judicial attitude toward mergers generally. An unsuccessful Justice Department
merger challenge on a unilateral effects theory in 2004 likely discouraged that agency from litigating again under

26
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losses—three of which involve digital markets 27—call into question whether the courts can be
relied upon to evaluate mergers appropriately to protect competition, both generally and in the
digital markets of particular concern to the Committee.
We divide the legal hurdles into three categories: those mainly restricting exclusionary conduct
cases, those mainly restricting merger cases, and those importantly restricting both. Although
this list is not exhaustive (there are other legal hurdles we have not mentioned) we see these
errors as particularly important.
Exclusionary Conduct
Several legal developments limit meritorious cases challenging exclusionary conduct that harms
competition. 28
•
•

Courts have nearly eliminated challenges to unilateral refusals to deal 29 and
predatory pricing claims. 30
The courts have created a gap between Sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act that
insulates anticompetitive single-firm, exclusionary-conduct from condemnation
when the excluding firms do not satisfy the high market share threshold that

that theory for nearly a decade. The high agency success rate may also reflect a willingness of some merging firms
to litigate even when they are likely to lose, as the firms may choose to do when they perceive a large private benefit
of winning. When the agencies spend resources on those cases, they cannot take on more aggressive challenges.
Government enforcers lost merger challenges in three digital market cases. United States v. AT&T, Inc., 310 F.
Supp. 3d 166 (D.D.C. 2018), aff’d 916 F.3d 1029 (2019); New York v. Deutsche Telekom AG, 2020 WL 635499
(D.D.C. 2018); U.S. v. Sabre Corp., 2020 WL 1855433 (D. Del. 2020). They also lost a merger challenge in Federal
Trade Commission v. RAG-Stiftung, 2020 WL 532980 (D.D.C. 2020).

27

The Anticompetitive Exclusionary Conduct Prevention Act of 2020, S.3426, 116th Cong. addresses some of these
problems. This statement focuses on the adequacy of legal rules and institutions, and not specific legislative
proposals for reform.

28

Trinko, 540 U.S. 398 at 407-08 (explaining that the Court is “very cautious” in recognizing exceptions to a firm’s
unilateral right to refuse to deal with rivals, and terming the holding in Aspen Skiing as a “limited exception” that is
“at or near the outer boundary” of Section 2 enforcement). See also Pacific Bell Telephone Co. v. linkLine
Communications, Inc., 555 U.S. 438, 448-51 (2009); Novell, Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 731 F.3d 1064, 1072-73 (10th
Cir. 2013) (Gorsuch, J.) (indicating that “today a monopolist is much more likely to be held liable for failing to leave
its rivals alone than for failing to come to their aid” and defending a “presumption of legality” for unilateral
conduct). Under today’s standards, it is at least questionable whether the government would have been successful in
breaking-up AT&T’s phone monopoly in the 1980s. Howard Shelanski, The Case for Rebalancing Antirust and
Regulation, 109 MICH. L. REV. 683, 684 (2011).
29

Brooke Group Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 509 U.S. 209, 223 (1993) (asserting that permitting
predatory pricing enforcement based on above cost prices would create “intolerable risks of chilling legitimate pricecutting”); id. at 227 (expressing skepticism about the difficulty of establishing below-cost pricing and recoupment);
id. at 227 (rejecting a finding of likelihood of recoupment on the facts, colored by the “general implausibility” of
predatory pricing, without considering the possibility recognized in the economics literature that predators could
recoup in multiple markets other than the one where predation occurred). See C. Scott Hemphill & Philip J. Weiser,
30

Beyond Brooke Group: Bringing Reality to the Law of Predatory Pricing, 127 YALE L. J. 2048, 2049 (2018)
(describing “serious criticism” of both the below-cost pricing requirement and recoupment requirement for
predatory pricing).

7
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•

courts usually employ for establishing monopoly power in a monopolization case
or establishing dangerous probability of success for attempted monopolization
(including monopoly leveraging). 31
The U.S. Supreme Court has been too willing to presume that monopolies
promote innovation, failing to recognize that because monopolies gained or
maintained through exclusionary conduct push other innovators out of the market,
those monopolies are much more likely to diminish than to increase innovation
overall. 32

Multiple legal developments have unnecessarily and without adequate economic justification
increased the burden on plaintiffs to prove meritorious exclusionary conduct cases.
•

•

•

Plaintiffs challenging the conduct of transaction platforms face unnecessary
demands in proving their cases, and when creating this problem, the Supreme
Court exacerbated it by not clearly specifying the limits of the transaction
platform category. 33
The Supreme Court has suggested that proof of anticompetitive effects requires
the demonstration of a reduction in output, even though a reduction in output may
be more difficult to prove than an increase in price, and even though it is not
necessary for conduct to harm competition among platforms. 34
Courts have treated exclusionary vertical conduct as presumptively
procompetitive, even in settings such as oligopoly markets and markets with
dominant firms where it is well-established that vertical restraints can harm
competition, with the practical effect of raising the plaintiff’s burden. 35

Spectrum Sports, Inc. v. McQuillan, 506 U.S. 447, 456 (1993). See also Verizon Communications Inc. v. Law
Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP, 540 U.S. 398 (2004). See generally Gavil, supra note 24. Courts often require a
70% share for finding monopoly power in a monopolization case, and a 50% share with a prospect of achieving a
70% share for finding dangerous probability of success in an attempted monopolization case. ANDREW I. GAVIL,
WILLIAM E. KOVACIC, JONATHAN B. BAKER & JOSHUA D. WRIGHT, ANTITRUST LAW IN PERSPECTIVE: CASES,
CONCEPTS AND PROBLEMS IN COMPETITION POLICY 640 (3d ed. 2017).
31

See Trinko, 540 U.S. 398 at 407 (construing the Sherman Act to “safeguard the incentive to innovate” by firms
exercising monopoly power). The Court does not appear to recognize, as discussed supra note 3 and accompanying
text, that competition generally spurs innovation and productivity while market power gained through exclusionary
conduct inhibits it.

32

Ohio v. American Express Co., 138 S.Ct. 2274, 2285 n.7, 2287 (2018) (requiring plaintiffs to prove that a vertical
restraint imposed by a transaction platform harms competition in a market encompassing both sides of the platform,
and rejecting proof by direct evidence by requiring market definition to evaluate defendant market power). See
Michael L. Katz, Ohio v. American Express: Assessing the Threat to Antitrust Enforcement, 3:2 CPI ANTITRUST
CHRONICLE (June 2019) (describing adverse consequence threatened by the Court’s vague definition of transaction
platform).
33

34
American Express, 138 S.Ct. at 2288. See generally, Michael L. Katz & A. Douglas Melamed, Competition Law
as Common Law: American Express and the Evolution of Antitrust (U. Penn. L. Rev, forthcoming) (explaining why
output is a poor proxy for economic welfare in platform antitrust cases). The discussion of this point in American
Express does not appear to be limited to evaluating the conduct of transaction platforms.

See Gavil et al., supra note 31, at 913-15. Cf. American Express, 138 S. Ct. at 2297 (Breyer, J., dissenting)
(indicating that the majority “seems categorically to exempt vertical restraints from the ordinary “rule of reason”
analysis that has applied to them since the Sherman Act's enactment in 1890”).

35
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•

In some cases, courts decline to condemn exclusionary conduct that harms
competition on balance if the conduct benefits competition in any way, or
plausibly could do so, regardless of the magnitude of the competitive benefit, 36
either on the ground that any justification is sufficient or by applying analytical
approaches for evaluating reasonableness in ways that have the same practical
effect. 37

Mergers
Various legal developments limit the success of meritorious merger challenges and the
willingness of plaintiffs to bring such cases.
•

•

Plaintiffs face a higher practical burden when challenging anticompetitive
horizontal mergers because the structural presumption 38 has been eroded by the
courts, 39 effectively insulating horizontal mergers from challenge in markets with
more than a handful of rivals. 40
Courts have, in some cases, been wary of finding anticompetitive effects that are
(and perhaps must be) demonstrated primarily or entirely with qualitative
evidence, such as a reduction in potential competition or innovation. 41

See American Express, 138 S. Ct. at 2284 (explaining that under the rule of reason, if defendant successfully
demonstrates a procompetitive rationale for a restraint, defendant prevails (without comparing harms and benefits)
unless plaintiff can show that the efficiencies can reasonably be achieved through less anticompetitive means);
Novell, 731 F.3d at 1072 (defining anticompetitive conduct in a monopolization case by asking “whether, based on
the evidence and experience derived from past cases, the conduct at issue before us has little or no value beyond the
capacity to protect the monopolist’s market power”); id. at 1075 (explaining that in a monopolization case based on
a unilateral refusal to deal with a competitor, “the monopolist’s conduct must be irrational but for its anticompetitive
effect”).
36

37
See, e.g., Viamedia, Inc. v. Comcast Corp. 951 F.3d 429, 461-62 (7th Cir. 2020) (declining to follow Novell in
employing a standard characterized as “essentially” a “no economic sense” test to the extent that standard precludes
comparing competitive harms with competitive benefits). The “no economic sense” standard is controversial even
apart from whether courts have applied it properly. Compare Steven C. Salop, Exclusionary Conduct, Effect on
Consumers, and the Flawed Profit-Sacrifice Standard, 73 ANTITRUST L.J. 311 (2006), and Andrew I. Gavil,
Exclusionary Distribution Strategies by Dominant Firms: Striking a Better Balance, 72 ANTITRUST L.J. 3 (2004)
with A. Douglas Melamed, Exclusive Dealing Agreements and Other Exclusionary Conduct—Are There Unifying
Principles?, 73 ANTITRUST L.J. 375 (2006), and Gregory J. Werden, Identifying Exclusionary Conduct Under
Section 2: The ‘‘No Economic Sense’’ Test, 73 ANTITRUST L.J. 413 (2006).

When courts presume that a horizontal merger harms competition from a significant increase in concentration in a
highly concentrated market, they are applying the “structural presumption.”
38

E.g., United States v. Baker Hughes, Inc., 908 F. 2d 981, 984 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (describing concentration as simply
“a convenient starting point” for a “totality-of-the-circumstances” analysis); id. at 991-92 (explicitly disclaiming a
requirement that defendants make a “clear showing” to rebut the inference of competitive harm).
39

40

See supra note 25 and accompanying text.

E.g., United States v. AT&T Inc., 310 F. Supp. 3d 161, 242-49 (D.D.C. 2018), aff’d 916 F.3d 1029 (D.C. Cir.
2019) (rejecting theory that merger would stifle innovation from virtual cable providers); ; Federal Trade
Commission\v. v. Steris, 133 F. Supp.3d 962, 978 (N.D. Ohio 2015) (requiring government to prove that, absent the
merger, the potential competitor “probably would have entered” the market).
41
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•
•

•

•

Courts have, in some cases, raised the practical burden on plaintiffs challenging
anticompetitive mergers by accepting self-interested testimony of defendants’
executives inconsistent with economic reasoning and documentary evidence. 42
Courts have insulated acquisitions of potential rivals by dominant firms from
challenge by limiting such cases to acquisitions of firms that demonstrably plan to
enter the market in which the acquiring firm competes within a relatively short
period of time. 43
Courts have further insulated acquisitions of potential rivals by dominant firms
from challenge by interpreting the Clayton Act not to reach acquisitions when the
likelihood of competitive success for the acquired firm is less than 50 percent,
regardless of the size of the potential competitive benefit from that success. 44
The market definition rules governing transaction platforms in the wake of a
recent Supreme Court decision involving vertical restraints 45 have been
interpreted to bar a challenge to a transaction platform’s acquisition of a nonplatform rival. 46

Exclusionary Conduct and Mergers
Other legal developments limit both meritorious exclusionary conduct and merger cases.
•
•

Courts have discouraged meritorious challenges to exclusionary vertical conduct,
including vertical mergers, by systematically favoring defendants in vertical
restraints litigation. 47
The Supreme Court has suggested that market definition is required, and direct
evidence is insufficient for proving market power, in exclusionary vertical
restraints cases. 48

42
See, e.g., Brief for 27 Antitrust Scholars as Amici Curiae in Support of Neither Party, United States v. AT&T, 916
F.3d 1029 (D.C. Cir. 2019) (No. 18-5214). See also supra note 22.

E.g., FTC v. Steris Corp., 133 F. Supp. 3d 962 (N.D. Ohio 2015). Cf. Darren Bush & Salvatore Massa, Rethinking
the Potential Competition Doctrine, 4 Wis. L. Rev. 1035 (2004) (arguing for resurrecting the potential competition
doctrine).
43

Doni Bloomfield, Getting to “May Be”: Probability, Potential Competition, and the Clayton Act (unpublished
manuscript 2020). Cf. Report of the Digital Competition Expert Panel, Unlocking digital competition 100-101
(2019) (recommending “balance of harms” approach), https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/unlockingdigital-competition-report-of-the-digital-competition-expert-panel. These legal rules also make it difficult for
enforcers to challenge and deter serial acquisitions, no single one of which meets today’s demanding standards but
which collectively eliminate competition.
44

45

Ohio v. American Express Co., 138 S.Ct. 2274 (2018).

U.S. v. Sabre Corp., 2020 WL 1855433 (D. Del. 2020). See Randy M. Stutz, We’ve Seen Enough: It Is Time to
Abandon Amex and Start Over on Two-Sided Markets (Am. Antitrust Inst. 2020),
https://www.antitrustinstitute.org/work-product/aai-says-its-time-to-cancel-amex-sabre-farelogix-opinion-makes-amockery-of-market-definition/.
46

See, e.g., Douglas H. Ginsburg, Vertical Restraints: De Facto Legality Under the Rule of Reason, 60 ANTITRUST
L.J. 67 (1991).
47

48

Supra note 33.
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•
•

Courts have expanded their ability to grant defendants immunity from the
antitrust laws. 49
Courts increasingly view an industry’s technological progress, with products
improving and output increasing over time, as justification for declining to find an
antitrust violation, 50 without always asking whether the industry would perform
even better were competition not impeded by the challenged conduct. 51

Consequences for Competition and Antitrust in Digital Markets
While these troubling judicial rules and decisions impede effective antitrust enforcement
generally, they do so particularly with respect to protecting competition in the digital
marketplace. Anticompetitive harm in these markets will often involve eliminating nascent or
potential competitors, diminishing quality, or suppressing innovation—all of which are precisely
the areas where courts have expressed skepticism. In many cases, current legal doctrine will give
dominant platforms the effective license to harm competition by engaging in unilateral refusals
to deal, predatory pricing, and exclusionary vertical conduct.
Beyond the specific hurdles that limit refusal-to-deal and predatory pricing claims, 52 some courts
require the plaintiff to prove that the exclusionary conduct has literally no actual or plausible
benefit to competition. And the Supreme Court has at least suggested that a plaintiff must
demonstrate an output reduction to prove anticompetitive effects and cannot rely exclusively on
direct evidence to prove market power. Collectively these rules promise to raise substantially the
practical burden faced by plaintiffs seeking to challenge anticompetitive exclusionary conduct by
platforms, thereby diminishing deterrence of anticompetitive conduct. 53
In addition, platforms may acquire nascent rivals with only limited concern for antitrust
challenge. These acquisitions eliminate firms that could someday offer products or services in
direct competition with those sold by incumbent firms. The acquired firms might, for example,
Credit Suisse Secs. (USA) LLC v. Billing, 551 U.S. 264 (2007) (upholding dismissal of proposed class action
because the securities laws implicitly precluded the application of the antitrust laws to the alleged conduct). See
Howard Shelanski, Antitrust and Deregulation, 127 YALE L. J. 1922, 1943 (2018) (explaining that Credit Suisse
“went beyond prior implied immunity cases to establish a rule that blocks some claims even when they rely on
legitimate antitrust principles, are consistent with securities laws, and, correctly read, would not interfere with the
applicable regulatory scheme”).
49

See New York v. Deutsche Telekom AG, 2020 WL 635499 at *46 (D.D.C. 2018) (observing that “[s]everal federal
courts have recognized that certain markets should be characterized as dynamic by reason of constant innovation
and other rapid changes, and that analysis of antitrust effects of specific transactions in such markets warrants more
particularized consideration than courts accord under traditional economic analysis, to that extent counseling greater
caution in judicial intervention”).
50

Cf. Giulio Federico, Fiona Scott Morton & Carl Shapiro, Antitrust and Innovation: Welcoming and Protecting
Disruption, in 20 INNOVATION POLICY AND THE ECONOMY 125, 155-56 (Josh Lerner & Scott Stern, eds. 2020)
(discussing the “fallacy” of inferring the absence of exclusionary conduct from the presence of market
improvements).
51

52

Supra notes 29 & 32 and accompanying text.

In addition, platforms may use arbitration provisions in their contracts with users to insulate themselves from
meritorious antitrust cases.

53
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already have such products under development, have R&D efforts underway to create such
products, have the capability to do so, or know the market well through the production of
complementary products. But all such acquisitions would be difficult to challenge under current
legal doctrine, even where the nascent rival would dramatically disrupt the market and enhance
competition substantially if it succeeded. 54
Resources and Institutions
Our antitrust enforcement institutions, like the courts, need to do more to address the challenge
of growing market power in the U.S. economy. One challenge is resources. Between 2008 and
2019, the economy has grown twice as fast as resources provided to the Antitrust Division and
the Federal Trade Commission, 55 even as the market power problem has been on the rise. Other
enforcers cannot be expected to pick up the slack because most state enforcement agencies are
small, and private enforcement has been constrained by Congress and the courts. 56 Limited
federal agency resources pose a particular problem for merger enforcement because private
plaintiffs and the states rarely find it cost effective to challenge anticompetitive mergers.
At times, moreover, the Department of Justice has abetted a judicial retrenchment in antitrust law
governing exclusionary conduct by dominant firms through its guidance and advocacy. One
example is the Section 2 report, issued by DOJ near the end of the George W. Bush
administration. 57 Among other things, the report suggested that unilateral refusals to deal by
dominant firms should be treated as virtually legal per se—thereby encouraging firms to
undertake such conduct and courts to permit it, even when competition is harmed.
During the current administration, moreover, the Justice Department has filed amicus briefs
advocating a standard for evaluating exclusionary conduct cases that courts have interpreted as
insulating that conduct unless plaintiff can prove it has literally no actual or plausible benefit to
competition. 58 And DOJ has, through another amicus brief, come close to denying any role for
54

Supra note 44 and accompanying text.

55
Kades, supra note 11. Alternatively, in real terms, “[t]he antitrust enforcement agencies had slightly fewer
resources in 2018 ($471 million) as they did nearly 20 years earlier, in 2001 ($491 million). Id. at Fig. 11. Congress,
at the request of this committee, did increase FTC appropriations by $40 million dollar for fiscal year 2020.

One constraint on private enforcement is a Supreme Court decision allowing firms to require by contract separate
arbitration for each individual plaintiff. Am. Express Co. v. Italian Colors Rest. 570 U.S. 228 (2013). They also
include decisions raising barriers to class actions. E.g., Comcast Corp. v. Behrend, 569 U.S. 27 (2013).
56

U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, COMPETITION AND MONOPOLY: SINGLE-FIRM CONDUCT UNDER SECTION 2 OF THE
SHERMAN ACT (2008), www.justice.gov/atr/public/reports/236681.pdf, withdrawn, Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of
Justice, Justice Department Withdraws Report on Antitrust Monopoly Law (May 11, 2009),
https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/justice-department-withdraws-report-antitrust-monopoly-law. This report was not
joined by the FTC and it was withdrawn at the start of the Obama administration.
57

E.g., Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae in Support of Neither Party at 15, Viamedia, Inc. v. Comcast
Corp. 951 F.3d 429, 461-62 (7th Cir. 2020), https://www.justice.gov/atr/case/viamedia-inc-v-comcast-corp-et-al
(advocating that the court “follow Novell and hold that satisfying the “no economic sense” test is necessary to bring
a Section 2 refusal-to-deal case” because that test “helps ensure that a refusal to deal with a competitor does not
violate Section 2 if ‘valid business reasons exist for that refusal.’”).
58
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antitrust enforcement when firms contributing patents to industry standards are found to
monopolize markets by evading a commitment to license on reasonable terms. 59
In both settings, DOJ’s amicus briefs encouraged courts to adopt legal rules that would raise
barriers to plaintiffs seeking to prove meritorious cases. To take its position in the case involving
maintenance of monopoly by evading a licensing commitment and excluding rivals, the Justice
Department undertook an unusual and uncompelled intervention in an appeal of an FTC
enforcement action after the Federal Trade Commission had prevailed in the district court.
Both the Federal Trade Commission and the Justice Department have at times abetted the
judicial retrenchment in antitrust law, particularly as it applies to the conduct of high-tech
platforms, by declining to challenge (or in some cases even investigate) nearly all of the large
number of platform acquisitions of arguably nascent competitors, 60 and declining to challenge
platform conduct that has been the subject of enforcement actions by sophisticated competition
agencies abroad. Without regard to the merits of any individual decision, this systematic pattern
of enforcement avoidance suggests that until now, the agencies have been too cautious in their
enforcement posture toward Internet platforms. We hope that recent agency institutional
commitments, such as the FTC’s creation of the Technology Division and the agencies’ public
acknowledgement of investigations, presage an increased enforcement effort.
The Role of Congress
To address growing market power, remedy existing competitive problems, and deter new
competitive harms, action is required. For the past 40 years, the courts have imposed a policy
judgment that is too accommodating to anticompetitive conduct and too dismissive of the harm
that conduct can cause. But Congress need not be a silent partner in protecting competition. It
can and should revise the antitrust laws so they are no longer inconsistent with modern economic
thinking, correct the skewed error cost balance in existing judicial interpretations, and ensure that
our antitrust enforcement institutions are properly funded and designed to succeed.
Congress has corrected the trajectory of court decisions in the past. In 1914, amid concerns about
the limitations of Sherman Act interpretation and enforcement, Congress strengthened the
antitrust laws by enacting the Clayton and Federal Trade Commission Acts. In 1950, through the
Cellar-Kefauver Act, Congress closed loopholes in the primary merger control statute, Section 7
of the Clayton Act, and encouraged courts and enforcers to view mergers more skeptically. 61
Brief of the United States of America as Amicus Curiae in Support of Appellant and Vacatur, FTC v. Qualcomm
Inc., 411 F.Supp.3d 658 (N.D. Calif.), appeal filed and stay granted, 935 F.3d 752 (9th Cir. 2019),
https://www.justice.gov/atr/case-document/file/1199191/download. See also Makan Delrahim, Assistant Att’y Gen.,
Take It to the Limit: Respecting Innovation Incentives in the Application of Antitrust Law (Nov. 10, 2017),
https://www.justice.gov/opa/speech/assistant-attorney-general-makan-delrahim-delivers-remarks-usc-gould-schoollaws-center.
59

But see Final Judgment, United States v. Google Inc., No. 1:11-cv-00688 (D.D.C. 2011) (accepting consent
settlement resolving competitive issues raised by Google’s acquisition of ITA); Press Release, U.S. Department of
Justice, Antitrust Division, Yahoo! Inc. and Google Inc. Abandon Their Advertising Agreement (Nov. 5, 1995),
https://www.justice.gov/archive/atr/public/press_releases/2008/239167.htm.

60

In addition, in 1936 Congress sought to protect rivals and suppliers from the exclusionary consequences of the
exercise of market power by supermarkets and other retail chains by enacting the Robinson-Patman Act. Cf. Daniel
61

13

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3632532

Once again, Congress has an historic opportunity to identify adverse trends in judicial
interpretation of the antitrust and correct problems—not just by overriding damaging precedents,
but also by reshaping the antitrust laws more broadly to enhance deterrence of anticompetitive
conduct.
With respect to the Committee’s particular interest in protecting and fostering competition
among online platforms, a number of reforms could be considered. We do not collectively or
unanimously endorse any of these, though some of us have done so in other contexts.
Congress could correct various flawed judicial rules, including those noted above, that
inappropriately circumscribe antitrust enforcement. 62 Congress also could act affirmatively to
enhance deterrence of anticompetitive conduct, either by amending the existing antitrust statutes
or enacting new ones. For instance, Congress could codify that, in an antitrust case, direct proof
of anticompetitive effects can satisfy the plaintiff’s initial burden, without need for
circumstantial proof such as inferences made by defining markets and calculating market
shares. 63
Congress also could clarify that the antitrust laws protect potential and nascent competition. In
addition, Congress might consider legislation allowing plaintiffs to prevail in exclusionary
conduct or merger cases by showing that the challenged conduct increases the risk of competitive
harm, instead of the current legal standards, which require, in general, a showing that
competitive harm is more likely than not. Or Congress could specify presumptions of
competitive harm that, for example, would apply in evaluating a dominant firm’s exclusionary
conduct or acquisitions. 64
Congress also can enhance the deterrence of anticompetitive exclusion and mergers by
increasing enforcement resources, through appropriations, and by increasing penalties. Some of
us have proposed still other institutional reforms that Congress might consider, including
lowering the threshold for pre-merger notifications to help address insufficient deterrence of
anticompetitive acquisitions, particularly by dominant firms acquiring nascent rivals, and
creating a specialized trial court for antitrust litigation. 65
A. Crane, Antitrust Antitextualism, Notre Dame L, Rev. (forthcoming), working paper available at
https://ssrn.com/abstract=3561870 (explaining that when the courts have departed from the text and original
meaning of the antitrust statutes, they have done so consistently in the direction of reading the antitrust statutes in
favor of big business).
62

See supra notes 29-51 and accompanying text.

For further discussion, see Andrew I. Gavil & Steven C. Salop, Probability, Presumptions and Evidentiary
Burdens in Antitrust Analysis: Revitalizing the Rule of Reason for Exclusionary Conduct (U. Penn. L. Rev.,
forthcoming), working paper available at https://scholarship.law.georgetown.edu/facpub/2218/.

63

For further discussion of possible presumptions of competitive harm Congress might consider, see Baker, supra
note 2; Jonathan B. Baker, Nancy L. Rose, Steven C. Salop & Fiona Scott Morton, Five Principles for Vertical
Merger Enforcement Policy, 33 ANTITRUST 12 (2019); Gavil & Salop, supra, note 63.

64

See Stigler Center, supra note 14, Jonathan B. Baker & Fiona Scott Morton, Confronting Rising Market Power
(Economists for Inclusive Prosperity Policy Brief, 2019), https://econfip.org/policy-brief/confronting-rising-marketpower/#.
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We are grateful that the Committee has joined the conversation about how to protect competition
in today’s U.S. economy, and particularly competition among or on digital platforms. We would
be happy to assist the Committee in developing detailed legislative proposals or other initiatives
to strengthen the antitrust laws and antitrust enforcement.
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